Vi skulle aldri latt banksterne få oppgaven med å utstede gjeld. Dette skulle vært oppgaven til templene og palassene, underforstått staten. Slik ville gjeldsproblemet vært mye enklere å takle. Dette er det første feilgrepet vi gjorde, i.e. innføringen av kapitalismen og det «frie marked».
«This time truly is different. We should have learned from past experience that debt tends not to be very permanent; it often defaults. We should therefore expect huge periods of debt defaults, and we should expect to need frequent debt jubilees. Economist Michael Hudson reports that the structure of debt was very different in the past (Killing the Host or excerpt). In early times, he found that by far the major creditors were the temples and palaces of Bronze Age Mesopotamia, not private individuals acting on their own. Because of the top-down nature of the debt, it was easy for the temples and palaces to forgive debt and restore balance to the social structure.
Now, especially since World War II, there is a new belief in the permanency of debt, and about its suitability for funding insurance companies, banks, and pension plans. The rise in economic growth after World War II was important in this new belief in permanency, because without economic growth, it is extremely difficult to pay back debt with interest, unless debt is used for a truly productive purpose. (See also Figures 2 and 4, above)
The Ngram chart above, showing the frequency of word searches for “economic growth, IRA, financial services, MBA, and pension plans” indicates that economic growth was essentially a new concept after World War II. Once it became clear that the economy could grow, financial services began to grow, as did the training of MBAs. Pension plans grew at first, but once companies with pensions found it was difficult to keep them adequately funded, there was a shift to IRAs. With IRAs, employees are expected to fund their own retirements, generally using a combination of stock and debt purchases.
Now that debt is “reused” and integrated into the economy, it becomes much more difficult to forgive. We have a situation where insurance companies, banks, and pension plans are all tied together. They all depend on the current economic growth paradigm, including use of debt with interest, continued dividend plans, and rising stock market prices. We have a major problem if widespread debts defaults start.» – Tverberg
Det andre store feilgrepet var å forlate gullstandarden for å berede vegen for evig vekst rett inn i stjernehimmelen.
«So the entire edifice of debt-funded growth is now being called into question — at least by those who are paying attention or who aren’t hopelessly blinkered by a belief system rooted in the high net energy growth paradigms of the past.
At any rate, I started the chart in 1970 because it was in 1971 that the US broke the dollar’s linkage to gold. The rest of the world complained for a bit at the time, but politicians everywhere quickly realized that the loss of the golden tether also allowed them to spend with wild abandon and rack up huge deficits. So it was wildly popular.
As long as everybody played along, this game of borrowing and then borrowing some more was fun. In one of the greatest circular backrubs of all time, the central banks and banking systems of the developed world all bought each other’s debt, pretending as if it all made sense somehow:
The above charts show how hopelessly entangled the worldwide web of debt has become. Yes, it’s all made possible by the delusion that somehow being owed money by an insolvent entity will endlessly prevent your own insolvency from being revealed. How much longer can that delusion last?
All of this is really just the terminal sign of a major credit bubble — a credit era, if you will — drawing to a close.
I will once again rely upon this quote by Ludwig Von Mises because apparently its message has not yet sunk in everywhere it should have:“There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.”Well, the central banks of the world could not bring themselves to voluntarily end the credit expansion – that would have taken real courage.
~ Ludwig Von Mises
So now we are facing something far worse.» – Martenson
Det tredje store feilgrepet er å late som ingenting. Det er vi mennesker flinke til!